The paper examines price discounting by health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs) in markets for hospital services. Our empirical analysis focuses on transaction prices for angioplasty, which is a relatively common procedure with well-defined ''product'' characteristics. After controlling for patient and procedure heterogeneity and market power, we find that on average angioplasty prices are 8% lower for PPOs than for fee-for-service plans, followed by point-of-service HMOs, which capture a 24% discount. Our results are in general agreement with earlier work by Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000) , who show that managed care discounts are ''real,'' after accounting for case severity and process of care.
It is generally assumed that managed care has been successful at lowering prices, but the implications have been a matter of debate. Critics have argued that managed care organizations attain savings by reducing intensity of services; others have argued that savings are ''real'' and are a consequence of discounts per unit of care, rather than a consequence of reduced intensity. Examining treatment episodes for acute myocardial infarctions (i.e., heart attacks), Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000) suggest that discounts are attained by managed care plans without sacrificing intensity. They pose the question, ''Does managed care achieve discounts through reduced intensity?'' We rephrase the question as, ''Does managed care achieve discounts even after ac-counting for product heterogeneity?'' To address this, we use a unique claims database that contains relatively rich detail on both sources of payment and on the process of care for hospital procedures. The specific procedure that we focus on is angioplasty, which is suitable for empirical research because it is a well-defined and relatively common cardiac procedure.
Our study complements Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse in one other important dimension: their study examined differences among managed care options within a single large health maintenance organization (HMO), whereas we focus on differences among various insurers and employers. After accounting for market forces, case mix, and product heterogeneity, we find a high degree of residual discounting by managed care. Thus, despite the different frameworks the results in the two studies are in general agreement.
Our data enable us to observe transaction prices-that is, actual payments borne by the payer and received by the hospital rather than charges (i.e., gross prices that do not reflect price caps or discounts applied differently to various payers). Previously, Brooks, Dor, and Wong (1997) have shown that managed care has led to discounts in the case of another procedure, appendectomy. While we do not wish to err on the side of picking a procedure that is too complex to be adequately controlled for in a regression, the example of appendectomy may be too narrowly defined for a model designed to show how price discounts can persist when accounting for differences in the type of care delivered. Moreover, by using a more updated file, we are able to examine discounting by gradation of managed care, based on choices available in the self-insured firms that make up the data file. These choices, as defined in our data, are discussed in the second section. The third section presents the analytical framework for estimating the price equation; the fourth describes our main database and supplementary files. The fifth section presents descriptive information on price differences by gradations of managed care, and the sixth section presents regression results and the degree of discounting achieved by managed care. Implications are given in the concluding section.
Forms of Managed Care
For at least two decades, managed care enrollment has been growing rapidly. While only one-quarter of the privately insured population was enrolled in some form of managed care in 1985, the majority of this population is enrolled in managed care today. However, even within managed care there are substantial differences among the major types of plans, and their relative market shares have been changing over time. Thus, the relative market share of more traditional ''closed-form'' HMOs is beginning to level off, whereas the shares of ''open-form'' HMOs, preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and other hybrid forms combining managed care and feefor-service (FFS) are rising. According to recent data from the Health Insurance Association of America (2002) , between 1994 and 1997, the market share of fee-for-service plans for private insurance coverage fell from 32.8% to 21.2%. During that same period, the share of PPOs grew from 44.8% to 47.3%, and the market share of the most recent entrant to the managed care arena, namely point-of-service HMOs, more than doubled, rising from 1.8% to 4.8%. During the same period, traditional HMOs rose from 22.5% to 26.9%; however, these figures mask the fact that many of these HMOs were beginning to adopt open-market incentives as well. In the following discussions, we briefly review the definitions of the major forms of insurance.
The two forms of fee-for-service insurance are ''comprehensive'' and ''major medical'' plans. Under comprehensive insurance, patients can opt for any provider of their choosing, with the insurer essentially paying full cost up to some outlier limit. Major medical insurance is based on the same payment methodology and consumer choice as comprehensive fee-for-service, but restricts benefits to major medical and surgical procedures. PPOs are essentially fee-for-service plans, but with discounted fees and some limitation on choices available to consumers. Choices are limited to listings of providers who make up the PPO's network. Consumers retain an option to go outside the network, but incur higher copayments and deductibles in addition to higher fees if they opt to do so.
In closed-form HMOs, physicians can serve only patients who are enrolled in the plan. Physicians in closed-form HMOs are either salaried contract employees of the HMO (staff model) or contract workers (group model). In open HMOs, also referred to as independent practice associations (IPAs) or network HMOs, physicians and hospitals may have contracts with several HMOs and may see private fee-for-service patients as well. For the most part, contractual arrangements with hospitals in closed HMOs mirror those of open HMOs, although the largest closed HMO, Kaiser Permanente, does own hospitals outright in a few localities across the country. While both forms of HMOs differ in terms of how they contract with providers, both are predicated on the same consumer-insurer relationship, whereby premiums are essentially prepayment for any medical care needed with little or no cost sharing for patients and no out-of-plan choice.
More recently, hybrid forms of managed care have emerged, combining features of HMOs with features of PPOs or FFS plans. The hybrid forms include point-of-service (POS) HMOs and exclusive provider organizations (EPOs). POS-HMOs resemble traditional HMOs as long as consumers stay within the network: cost sharing by patients is minimal, but the ability to choose among providers is also minimal; in addition, patients are assigned a ''gatekeeper,'' usually a family physician or nurse case manager, and are not able to access specialists directly without the gatekeeper's referral. However, like PPOs, POS-HMOs give their members the option of choosing physicians and hospitals outside the network in exchange for higher out-of-pocket participation. Thus, while PPOs and POS-HMOs are different within-network, they resemble each other when consumers opt to go outside the network. Finally, like PPOS, EPOs negotiate discounted fees with network providers, but they provide no coverage for services rendered outside the network. Prices for services provided by hospitals within PPO networks typically are set separately for every major procedure. For POS-HMOs there are numerous permutations for price-setting mechanisms, which may include pricing by procedure or by episode (Anders 1996; Kongstvedt 2002) .
Analytical Framework
Transaction Prices for Angioplasty Angioplasty, named more fully percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), is a procedure intended to treat ischemic coronary artery disease. More than 530,000 PTCA procedures were performed in 1997 nationwide, with estimated charges exceeding $20 billion. 1 This procedure involves the introduction of a thin, flexible, hollow catheter into an artery in the groin. The catheter is advanced through the blood vessel to the heart. A special balloon tip on the catheter allows the physician to open a diseased (occluded) coronary artery by inflating the balloon and dilating the diseased vessel. First introduced in 1977, the PTCA procedure evolved from balloon angioplasty to the insertion of stents to avoid narrowing of the arteries after the procedure. In the period observed , about 40% of all angioplasties were done in combination with stents (see Table 1 ).
The MarketScan database, which is used in this study and is a claims database from large self-insured employers, reports actual payments received by the hospital, as opposed to charges, which do not reflect discounts and caps negotiated by insurers. We label the payments received as transaction prices. Another important dimension of price in our analysis is that it is reported for the ''principle procedure'' designation of angioplasty. The reason for reporting medical prices this way is summarized in the earlier study by Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000, pp. 535-536) :
At what level of aggregation should quantities be measured? There are literally thousands of individual services that a heart attack patient can receivespecific tests, units of blood, operating room time, etc. Disaggregating to the individual service level does not seem the most appropriate way to proceed, however. Rather, it is more natural to think of the good as ''bypass surgery and its related services'' or ''angioplasty and its related services,'' since this is the principal decision that individuals or physicians acting as their agents are making.
By focusing on angioplasty as the principal procedure, we adhere to their approach. However, we are also able to exploit the data further and account for product heterogeneity. This is further described in the data section. 2
Model Specification
Because of the wide dispersion in prices, price equations in this study are expressed in log-linear form (Brendt 1991) . In previous work, Brooks, Dor, and Wong (1997) derived a specific functional form for the price equation in a similar insurer-provider setting. By assuming a Nash-Bargaining game, their specification imposes the restriction that products (i.e., medical procedures) are homogeneous. 3 While the homogeneity assumption is inocuous in their example of appendectomy, a fairly simple and uniform procedure, it is too restrictive for our current example of heart surgery. For this reason, we adopt the more flexible hedonic price approach in our empirical framework. Accordingly, an end product can be viewed as a summation of product attributes. Each of these attributes is valued and therefore adds its own unique weight to the final price, which can be retrieved directly from a linear regression (Brendt 1991; Goldman and Grossman 1978) . Thus, we include various technical features of angioplasty in the price regressions. In addition, we borrow from Brooks, Dor, and Wong (1997) by incorporating available measure of relative bargaining power for insurers and hospital markets (i.e., their respective market structures). The general specification of the pricing equation can be summarized as follows:
lnPrice ¼ f ðproduct heterogeneity; case mix; hospital characteristics; insurance characteristics; market structureÞ
The vector ''product heterogeneity'' refers to variations in the way angioplasty is done, which are observed at the patient level; ''case mix'' is a summary measure for the overall severity of patients in the hospital admitted for this procedure. The vector ''insurance'' refers to the type of insurance plan, as reported in our data; ''hospital'' refers to hospital characteristics that are related to a hospital's bargaining position such as teaching status and form of ownership (for-profit, nonprofit); and ''market structure'' measures are for the two principal industries, namely health insurance and hospitals, thereby reflecting relative bargaining power. The measure of the hospital's case mix or severity (for angioplasty patients) will be based on its expected mortality rate. In an alternative specification, we include the standardized mortality ratio (SMR)-that is, the ratio of the actual rate to the expected rate, which is taken as an ad- verse measure of the hospital's clinical performance. We generally anticipate the expected mortality rate to be positively associated with prices, since higher case-mix hospitals require additional compensation; we expect the standardized mortality rate to be negatively associated with prices, since hospitals with adverse outcomes are less able to bargain for higher prices. Note that we are not interested in assessing the validity of such measures, which has been a matter of some debate (e.g., Thomas and Hoffer 1999; McClellan and Staiger 1999a,b) . Rather, our interest lies in replicating, or at least approximating information available to large purchasers during the period studied , and assessing the effect of this measure on the pricing decision. The algorithm most widely accepted during that period simply adjusted for age, gender, and the presence of major associated illnesses or comorbidities (Rosenthal 1997; Krakauer et al. 1992; HCFA 1993) . 4 Many localities, state data agencies, local hospital associations, business coalitions, and the like replicated this method for specific procedures such as PTCA. 5 As a measure of the best available information, we reconstruct expected and standardized mortality rates using this specification. Further details are provided in the next section.
Data and Variables

Overview
The analysis of hospital pricing data for PTCA procedures in the MarketScanÒ database was performed using data elements from multiple sources. The final analysis aimed at assessing the association between participation in a managed care program and hospital pricing used a number of data elements originating from the MarketScanÒ database. It also incorporated hospital characteristics (teaching status, ownership data, and market share) from the American Hospital Association (AHA) database, as well as managed care penetration rates as retrieved from the Area Resource File. Hospital-specific expected 30-day mortality rates for PTCA admissions were derived from Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR) files.
Main Analysis File: MarketScan
The main analysis file we use comes from MarketScan, a claims database drawn from ap-proximately 80 large self-insured employers. Maintaining their confidentiality was a precondition for contributing data to MarketScan. Therefore, individual records were stripped of the identity of the employer. 6 For purposes of this research, we obtained data for all hospital admissions for which angioplasty was the primary procedure in 1995 and 1996. After excluding outliers (upper 99 th and lower 1 st percentiles of the hospital payments), this left a combined raw sample size of 4,916 individual hospitalizations. Prior to 1995, the form of insurance plan was not reported in the data. As of 1995, detailed fields for managed care were added. These plans include comprehensive insurance, major medical, PPOs, and three forms of health maintenance organizations, namely staff/group model HMOs, POS-HMOs, and EPOs. There were no cases of staff or group HMOs in the data, which is not surprising given that self-insured firms are not likely to provide medical services internally. There were only 18 cases of EPOs in the combined analysis file; for purposes of analysis, these were combined with their closest managed care kin, namely PPOs.
While hospital-based discharge data tend to report ''charges'' in lieu of payments, the Market-Scan data, which are drawn from insurance-based claims, report only ''net payments.'' Charges are akin to list prices, prior to any insurer discounting, and thus may not necessarily reflect what the insurer actually paid. Net payments are the amount the hospital actually got paid, and thus are the actual transaction prices of interest to us. However, we are also able to exploit the data further and account for product heterogeneity using a number of variables. Among these are binary indicators for the number of vessels and stents, thrombolytic infusion (an anti-clotting device), and the number of comorbidities. In addition, we include a binary indicator that distinguishes between urgent and nonurgent (elective) procedures. In nonurgent cases, there is some flexibility for patients and their physicians in terms of scheduling angioplasty, so we expect prices of urgent procedures to be higher. 7 Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 .
Supplementary Data Sources
The data from MarketScan were augmented with variables describing market structure, at the level Managed Care Discounting of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The Herfindahl index for hospital markets was constructed from the AHA Annual Surveys for 1995 and 1994, and merged with the MarketScan data with a one-year lag. 8 Hospital market shares that make up the main component of this index were calculated from the number of total admissions. Other hospital characteristics that might be related to bargaining position also were taken from the AHA files. These are teaching status (i.e., binary indicators for no teaching, minor teaching, or major teaching) and type of ownership (i.e., government, for-profit, and nonprofit). In the MarketScan file, matching AHA identifications were missing for 530 cases, resulting in a final sample size of 4,386 for the price regressions. These mapped out to 452 hospitals and 146 MSAs. 9 Compared with all AHA hospitals with some capacity to perform angioplasties and/or cardiac catheterizations, MarketScan hospitals in our analysis file were somewhat more tilted toward nonprofit status but virtually identical to AHA hospitals in their distribution by teaching status. 10 The insurance industry is relatively fragmented, and, to date, detailed data on market share by type of insurance have not been compiled. The Area Resource File provided a measure of market segmentation, namely HMO penetration, or the percentage of the adult population enrolled in HMOs aggregated to the MSA. This variable also entered the sample with a one-year lag.
Expected mortality rates and standardized mortality rates for the aggregate hospital were taken from the MEDPAR files using the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) riskadjustment method. We applied this method to two logistic regression panels centered on 1991 and 1992, thereby obtaining expected mortality rates for 30 days post admission associated with angioplasty. 11 Expected and standardized mortality rates were merged, with equal lags, into the 1995 and 1996 MarketScan records by provider identification number. The observed and predicted hospital-level mortality rates are approximately 5%.
Descriptive Results
Mean transaction prices by type of insurance are reported in Table 2 , along with standard errors in parentheses, and sample sizes within each cell.
There are two major categories, and four subcategories: fee-for-service, which includes major medical and comprehensive insurance; and managed care, which includes PPOs and point-ofservice HMOs. The managed care options already have been described; major medical insurance provides coverage for major illnesses requiring large financial outlays, while excluding a variety of small procedures covered by comprehensive plans.
From these descriptive results, a number of interesting observations can be made. Between 1995 and 1996, there was a sharp decline in the number of cases with fee-for-service coverage, and a sharp increase in managed care in our data. Apparently, many employers switched from feefor-service to managed care during this period observed. Thus in 1995, the combined managed care options accounted for 25% of all cases; in 1996 their share rose to 46%. Within the feefor-service and managed care sectors, comprehensive coverage and PPO were dominant. Major medical in particular was disappearing from the marketplace, accounting for about 8% of all cases in 1995 but only 3% of cases in 1996.
In 1995, mean prices for angioplasty in the major medical, PPO, and HMO categories were virtually identical to each other, nearly $13,000, or about 6% below the fee-for-service price. Between 1995 and 1996, there was a slight increase in the mean PPO price and a slight decrease in the mean comprehensive fee-for-service price and POS-HMO prices. However, the relative rankings remained the same in 1996, with comprehensive prices highest, and HMO prices lowest, with a persistent differential of 8%, on average. Prices for major medical insurance increased sharply between 1995 and 1996, but this may have been an artifact of the small number of cases in the cell. Because prices in this group showed a wide variation, we decided not to lump it with the comprehensive fee-for-service category. The subsequent regression analysis allows us to determine whether such price differentials persist after prices are adjusted for various characteristics.
It is also interesting to observe mean unadjusted prices by major classifications of the procedure. As expected, prices for urgent procedures were substantially higher than prices for nonurgent procedures in all classes of insurance. With the exception of the HMO category, prices for the one vessel/with stent variation of the procedure were higher than prices for one vessel/no stent; prices for multiple vessels/with stent were higher than prices for multiple vessels/no stent procedures.
Regression Results
Log-price regressions are presented in Table 3 . Three variants of the specification are reported in the table as models 1, 2, and 3. The variables were identical, expect for the hospital outcome measure used (expected PTCA mortality, standardized PTCA mortality). For the most part, all other variables had similar effects across the specifications. Clinical descriptors of angioplasty tended to have statistically significant effects on price, indicating that the more complex the procedure, the higher the price. Stents were a more important determinant of price than number of vessels; stent combinations added anywhere from 24% to 28% to price, whereas multiple vessels alone added only 10%. Thrombolytic infusion added about 35% to 37% to price depending on the specification. 12 Prices for urgent procedures were about 15% to 16% higher than those for nonurgent procedures. The number of comorbidities, a measure of the underlying complexity of the particular case, also increased price significantly.
The coefficients of hospital characteristics indicate teaching status was not significant. This may be due to angioplasty having become a relatively routine procedure, making the reputation of teaching hospitals carry less weight. Compared with prices in public hospitals, prices at nonprofit hospitals were significantly lower, by about 13% to 14%; prices at for-profit hospitals tended to be higher by about 13% to 15%, with moderately significant coefficients. 13 Variables that capture the structure of health care markets were generally significant with signs in the expected direction. Thus the lagged Herfindahl index had a positive effect on price, while the lagged HMO penetration rate was negative.
There was no statistical difference in prices between 1995 and 1996. The variables of main interest pertain to the form of insurance and managed care. All of the related results were highly significant. Compared with fee-for-service, prices for PPOs were lower by about 8%, and prices for POS-HMOs were lower by about 24%. Prices for major medical plans fell in between PPO and HMO discounted prices, but pertained to a relatively small number of cases (see Table 1 ), and were less likely to be the result of capping benefits than discounting through negotiations with providers in a plan. Interestingly, discounts for managed care were even larger after adjusting for the process of care than would appear from the unadjusted means. Adding expected or standardized mortality rate to the model (specification 2 and 3) had a negligible effect on all other coefficients. Although these variables had the expected sign (positive for expected rate and negative for the standardized rate), the results were not statistically significant. These results are at least suggestive of the notion that information on hospital performance is not fully reflected in the determination of the market price. However, these results should be interpreted with caution since the validity of these measures has been called into question and purchasers may deliberately discount such information (McClellan and Staiger 1999b) .
Discussion and Implications
Anecdotes abound that managed care organizations attempt to lower their costs internally by providing lower payments to providers. Our analysis suggests that these payments represent discounts that persist even after adjusting for the underlying patient severity and the characteristics of the medical procedure in a given case, for managed care plans offered by employers. We further find that greater market concentration in hospitals tends to increase prices; HMO penetration tends to reduce prices. Together, these results are consistent with the predictions of the bargaining model. Our study complements an earlier related study by Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000) that focused on payments for heart attacks by type of insurance. Their analysis was centered on one large firm that offered a menu of managed care and indemnity choices to its employees. Our analysis incorporated a cross-section of many firms offering similar insurance plans but with choices not known within the firm. Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse found that HMOs made lower payments. After accounting for intensity of services-as measured in terms of length of stay and ancillary services providedthey were able to conclude that these payments were due to real discounts on a per unit basis, as high as 20%. Rather than focusing on the entire episode of care, our analysis focused on transaction prices for a specific procedure. Thus, we were able to rely on detailed information on variants of the procedure to obtain a price that is adjusted for patient severity and intensity of service delivered. While there may have been residual difference in resource use among plans in our data, the price discounts we calculated tend to pertain to a relatively homogeneous ''product.'' Even with different approaches to measurement, we found strong agreement between our analysis and that of Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse, namely that managed care insurers are able to capture substantial discounts for a given level of service. Interestingly, adjusting for service characteristics results in even greater managed care discounts than would appear from the unadjusted means in the descriptive analysis.
These results were not affected by the inclusion of hospital-level performance measures, such as the HCFA (now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services or CMS) expected mortality rate. These results suggest that information on hospital performance is not fully reflected in the determination of the market price; indeed, during the mid 1990s access to the CMS and other reporting systems was relatively limited. However, these results should be interpreted with caution since the validity of these measures has been questioned, leading purchasers to deliberately discount such information. Moreover, there have been calls for the federal government to improve the measurement and dissemination of quality information for hospital care on a national basis (Corrigan, Eden, and Smith 2002) . Future research should track the impact of new reporting systems on pricing as they enter the market and become more diffused. As the structure of the managed care industry has changed since the mid-1990s, future research also should examine whether discounts by managed care organizations persist. (2000) calculated price for each payer by dividing total revenues by adjusted discharges, given as the sum of actual inpatient cases and weighted outpatient visits. A similar approach is used by Manheim, Bazzoli, and Sohn (1994) . Keeler and Melnick (1999) calculated net revenue per discharge by multiplying each patient's total charge by the average discount factor for private patients at their hospital. Dranove and Ludwick (1999) caution that these methods provide approximations of actual prices and are subject to measurement error due to unobservable service mix differences. Tranaction prices avoid this pitfall, yet negotiations between hospitals and insurers often involve bundled prices, not necessarily individual procedures. However, there is ample anecdotal evidence that hospitals have been willing to grant procedure-specific discounts to HMOs in exchange for guaranteed referrals (Hilzenrath 1994) . Other accounts cite examples of carve-out arrangements and price negotiations between hospitals and insurers that pertain strictly to cardiac procedures such as coronary artery bypass grafting and PTCA (Anders 1996 , Hilzenrath 1994 . We consider results from the different approaches complementary. Melnick et al. (1992) found similar effects of managed care discounting in California. 3 Under the Nash bargaining model, two agents (such as the hospital and the insurer in our example) maximize some measure of their respective payoffs jointly. How the pie ends up being split depends on their relative bargaining power. For a brief review of the properties of this model in a health care setting see Dor and Watson (1995 Aron et al. 1998 , Heller et al. 2001 , for instance). The quality indicators assembled by the federal Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research were made available for only one year, 1997, (i.e., after our study period) and for only 19 states, and thus did not apply to our sample. 6 Health benefits in the United States remain heavily employer based with about 60% of all insured individuals being enrolled through employer-sponsored plans. Self-insurance by firms occurs more frequently than is commonly perceived. In 1993, 40% of all employees who received employersponsored health insurance benefits were enrolled in self-insured plans. In large firms of 500 or more employees, the proportion of insured employees in self-insured plan was even higher, at 63% (Acs et al. 1996) . By 1997, these self-insurance rates declined, but remained fairly high at 33% and 55%, respectively (Long and Marquis 1999) . 7 Urgent cases are defined as cases associated with a diagnosis of heart attack. We are grateful to Kent Kwoh, M.D., at the University of Pennsylvania, and David Baker, M.D., at the Northwestern University School of Medicine, for providing and validating ICD-9 codes for conditions such as acute myocardial infarction (AMI) (i.e., heart attacks). 8 The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of squared shares of admissions in the MSA. The AHA survey has a code flagging hospitals able to perform angioplasty and/or cardiac catheterization, but does not report number of admissions undergoing these procedures. For this reason, we opted to report the results based on the overall index. Using all admissions within a hospital, the Herfindahl index for angioplasty hospitals increases from .14 to .25; in alternate price regressions, both indices yielded qualitatively similar results, but the coefficients of the procedure-based index were not statistically significant. The full set of results is available from the authors upon request. 9 The authors are grateful to Douglas Wholey for providing a mapping of ARF counties to MSAs for purposes of the analysis. Also see Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson (1995) . 10 In 1995, 1,091 hospitals were flagged as having capacity to perform angioplasty and catheterization. Of these, about 54.8% had major teaching status, while 24.8% were major teaching hospitals. The distribution by ownership was 19.1% for public hospitals, 13% for for-profit hospitals, and 67.9% for nonprofit hospitals. See similar Market-Scan distributions in Table 1 . 11 Three-year panels were used to minimize estimation error in the calculation due to single-year fluctuations (Luft and Romano 1993) . While our intention was to adhere to the most widely known and accepted methodology, we made this concession to methodology on the assumption that purchasers would be able to infer random fluctuations in hospitals in their localities. In practice, using annual expected rates or three-year moving average made little difference in the price regressions. Results from the auxiliary mortality regressions are available from the authors upon request. 12 To obtain accurate percentage changes in the semi-log specification, coefficients of binary variables are converted using the transformation e b À1. 13 We also experimented with interaction terms between each hospital characteristic and type of insurance. The corresponding coefficients were not statistically significant. Therefore we opted to report the more parsimonious specification in this paper.
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